Exiled Iranians and Venezuelans may support regime change, but the diaspora does not always reflect politics at home

Protest and military action also raised the possibility of this happening Regime change in Iran And VenezuelaThe voices of the diaspora in both countries were heard loud and clear through the media in the host countries.
Venezuelan exiles in the United States were, according to the popular narrative, Widely behind President Donald Trump And his plan to “administer Venezuela,” as he called it.Magazuelan“Suggests. Meanwhile, the Iranian diaspora They rallied behind Prince Reza Pahlavi He positioned himself as a leader-in-waiting, and projected an image of united support in exile.
Diasporas are often treated by the media and policymakers as homogeneous blocs – politically unified, ideologically coherent, and ready to mobilize for regime change. But K Researcher on migration and security issues in Latin AmericaI know that this assumption misunderstands how diaspora communities form, develop, and engage politically.
Iranian and Venezuelan immigrants may broadly oppose their current governments – and having left them, this is not surprising. But they are far from united on what should replace those governments, who should lead, or how change should happen.
Migration waves shape politics
Diaspora communities are not unified because the populations they comprise did not arrive all at once, from the same places, or for the same reasons. Each migration wave carries distinct political orientations shaped by the circumstances of departure.
Let us consider here the situation of the Turkish diaspora in Europe. They have a reputation for religious conservatism and nationalism that favor the ruling party of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan – a seeming paradox given that most of them live in liberal democracies. Support for centre-left parties in their host countries.
The explanation lies in history, as a diaspora researcher Eva Ostergaard Nielsen It has detailed. Turkish immigration to Europe came in successive waves, each marginalized by the Turkish secular establishment that dominated the country’s politics for long until the rise of Erdogan in the early 2000s. Religious conservatives fled discrimination, Kurds fled persecution, and economic migrants came later. The ruling Justice and Development Party led by Erdogan has benefited from this Active outreach To these established diaspora communities.

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Only recently have those fleeing the AKP government itself begun to flee Establish a foothold in the diaspora. In a working paper, Gulcan Saglalam and me I find that sentiment towards the Turkish ruling party cannot be predicted by the demographic profile, nor can it be countered by integration or support for liberal EU parties. Rather, members of diaspora politics derive information from individual personal beliefs and perceptions discrimination.
The Turkish experience also speaks of the tendency of expatriates to freeze politically at the moment of departure from their countries of origin. The same pattern appears across contexts. For example, El Salvador diaspora In the United States, which she first left during the civil war in the 1980s, she has gained a reputation for being “stuck in the 1980s” — still fighting mental battles that are long over at home.
This temporal displacement has consequences. Iranian-American sociologist Asef BayatWriting about the Iranian diaspora, he says opposition to the ruling government in exile back home “suffers from a political disease, pitting itself against the movement it claims to support.”
In other words, diaspora activists may advocate positions that resonate with Western audiences, but find little support among those already living under authoritarian rule. This lack of accountability Political consequences at home It can anger the constituencies they seek to defend.
Research on the Venezuelan diaspora reflects similar dynamics. A 2022 study found That Venezuelan exiles hold more extreme anti-Venezuelan government views than those who remain.
The myth of diaspora influence
But despite the supposed disconnect between diaspora groups, politicians back home often devote disproportionate attention to those who have left. The logic is simple: immigrants send money back to their home countries – which is… Up to 25% of GDP In some countries of Central America and the Caribbean. Politicians assume that this financial power translates into political power impact On relatives receiving remittances.
“If we get one Salvadoran in Washington to support us, that gives us five votes in El Salvador — and it doesn’t even matter if the Salvadoran votes in Washington,” one party official in El Salvador told me.
for me Private research I tested this assumption using polling and voting data across Latin America and found it to be overstated. Remittances and family contact often reinforce existing cross-partisanship rather than swing votes.
But belief in diaspora influence has political significance. Diaspora voters can be used as a weapon by authoritarian leaders.
Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele in his successful speech Clearly unconstitutional 2024 re-election bid, expanding external voting through Online pollingresulting in an 87-fold increase in diaspora votes during the year Previous elections.
He then directed all diaspora votes to be counted in San Salvador, despite the arrival of more immigrants from the eastern departments of San Miguel and La Unión. This helped sink the remaining opposition parties in the capital.
Diaspora in opposition
What happens when the diaspora opposes authoritarian governments rather than supporting them? The scholarship provides real-life lessons.
Expatriates can influence the politics of their country of origin through several channels: direct voting, financial support for opposition movements, lobbying host governments, and transmitting democratic values through what the sociologist says. Peggy Levitt They are called “social remittances” – the ideas, practices and norms that flow alongside remittances.
last Research has found that Remittances can undermine dictatorships by helping to finance opposition activities.

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However, authoritarian governments have developed Advanced countermeasures. Search about Documents of Arab activity in the diaspora Shows how governments deter dissent through transnational repression. Freedom House, a democracy and good governance NGO. registered More than 1,200 incidents of “transnational physical repression” against opponents – including assassinations, kidnappings, assaults and illegal deportations – between 2014 and 2024 involving 48 governments.
The Cuban example
The Cuban exile community provides perhaps the most studied example of diaspora political mobilization. For decades, the Cuban American lobby shaped & Some might say dictated – United States policy towards Cuba.
However, it is easy to overestimate this effect. Exiles who fled immediately after the 1959 revolution for political reasons constitute a smaller share of the total Cuban diaspora than is usually assumed.
Subsequent waves of immigration included a much larger number of working-class economic migrants with different political orientations. By 2014, Opinion polls showed 52% Many Cuban Americans opposed the US embargo, which was defended by their lobby. The influence of the lobby diminished after its founder Death of Jorge Mas Canosa In 1997, W Elian Gonzalez case – A messy international custody battle involving a 6-year-old Cuban boy – further divided the community.
The limits of the politics of exile
For Venezuela and Iran, these lessons advise caution. almost 8 million Venezuelans They fled their homeland – the largest displacement crisis in the Western Hemisphere. Meanwhile, Iranian Migration accelerated After the 2022 protests.
Both diasporas include passionate activists, wealthy donors, and would-be leaders positioning themselves for future governance. But emotion does not equal unity, and appearance does not equal acting.
The loudest voices on social media – or those amplified by government officials and the media in the United States – may represent narrow segments of diverse communities. Some characters show unified support that they don’t actually have. There may be a rough consensus on opposition to the hated government at home, but much less consensus on what to do – or how to achieve change.
Diaspora opposition does not necessarily translate into weakness for the government. Authoritarian states have learned how to insulate themselves from diaspora pressures while at the same time using immigration as a safety valve, turning potential dissidents into remittance senders—as Cuba did by reversing the repeal of its immigration law. Exit visas In 2013.
Diasporas can contribute to democratic change through funding, advocacy, and slow action to transmit democratic values. But ultimately, the path to democratic change in Venezuela, Iran and elsewhere will be determined by those who stay, not those who leave. Diaspora can support this struggle; They can’t replace him.



